Draftv0.1.0-alpha · revised 2026-08-01
The Problem of Incentive Design
Why systems reward outcomes nobody chose.
Draft: Written but unreviewed. Content may change substantially.
The core observation
Participants respond to payoffs. When a system pays more for restricting supply than for expanding it, supply gets restricted — by decent people acting reasonably.
Failure patterns the framework targets
- Artificial scarcity — profit from withholding rather than producing
- Rent-seeking — capture of value without contribution
- Short-term extraction — depletion of a productive base for near-term return
- Suppression — acquisition or litigation used to prevent a better product
- Idle accumulation — capital removed from circulation without redeployment
Design response
Each pattern is addressed by changing what is rewarded, not by prohibiting the behaviour:
| Pattern | Counter-incentive |
|---|---|
| Artificial scarcity | Reward measured output and access, not margin per unit |
| Rent-seeking | Require disclosed contribution in any institutional agreement |
| Short-term extraction | Account for lifetime and system value, not transaction price |
| Suppression | Institutional funding conditioned on publication and licensing |
| Idle accumulation | Capital recycling |
Open problem
Measuring these patterns without creating a new incentive to game the measurement is unresolved. See Open Research Questions.
Chapter metadata
- Status
- Draft
- Version
- 0.1.0-alpha
- Created
- 2026-08-01
- Last revised
- 2026-08-01
- Last reviewed
- Not yet reviewed
- Authors
- ISILP
- Governing proposals
- IIP-0001
- Source
spec/100-foundations/incentive-design.mdx
Cite this page
ISILP. The Problem of Incentive Design. The Intelligentism Specification, version 0.1.0-alpha (revised 2026-08-01). https://intelligentism.isilp.org/spec/foundations/incentive-design